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9.1 Introduction
The abuse orexcessive consumption ofalcohol can have a variety ofadverse
consequences. The health and safety consequences are perhaps the most dra-
matic, but alcohol abuse also has important implications for labor market pro-
ductivity. As much as 10 percent of the U.S. labor force meets criteria for a
current diagnosis ofalcohol abuse ordependence (Stinson, Debakey, and Stef-
fens 1992). The mostrecent comprehensive study ofthe economic costofalco-
hol abuse estimates the lost earnings ofworkers suffering from alcohol prob-
lems at $36.6 billion in 1990 (Rice 1993). However, when methodological
problems are addressed, there is uncertainty as to the size oreven the existence
of alcohol's direct effect on wages (Cook 1991; Kenkel and Ribar 1994). The
accumulating empirical evidence suggests that some of the most important
productivity effects of alcohol abuse are through indirect channels (Mullahy
and Sindelar 1994); for example, there is good evidence that drinking reduces
individuals' investment in schooling (Cook and Moore 1993). Nevertheless,
the relationship between alcohol abuse and postschooling human capital in-
vestment remains largely unexplored.
After completing schooling, young workers face critical labor market
choices. Young workers 'job shop" as they search for productive and durable
employment relationships (Topel 1991). They must find their first job, and then
typically will change jobs several times before settling into more stable em-
ployment. When searching, the young workers comparejobs that pay different
wages, provide different levels offringe benefits, and offer different potentials
for wage growth and advancement. Furthermore, the search involves choices
about occupation, industry of employment, and firm size. These job choices
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made by young adults have long-ranging consequences for future jobs and life-
time earnings.
Many young adults also drink alcohol to excess. Based on national survey
data, the percentage ofpeople aged 18-29 meeting criteria for current alcohol
dependence is over 80 percent higher than that ofthose aged 30-44, and qua-
druple that ofthose aged 45-64 (Grant et al. 1991). The survey data are corrob-
oratedby the fact that young drivers are overrepresented in drunkdriving statis-
tics; for example, in 1994 the 14 percent ofD.S. drivers aged 16-24 accounted
for 28 percent ofdrinking driver deaths (Campbell et al. 1996).
In this paper, we provide some evidence on whether the drinking choices of
young adults have long-range consequences for future jobs and lifetime earn-
ings. In doing so, we extend previous research on the productivity effects of
alcohol to include nonwage job attributes as part oftotal employee compensa-
tion. The goal of this research is to establish benchmark empirical patterns
describing relationships between alcoholism and job choice.
We examine data on young adult men from the 1989 wave of the National
Longitudinal Survey ofYouth (NLSY) to document the empirical relationships
between alcoholism and a comprehensive array ofjobattributes not considered
in previous work. As discussed in section 9.2, studies find that alcoholism (or
some other measure ofproblem drinking) has important effects on labor mar-
ket productivity, as measured by income or wages. As we argue in section 9.3,
however, if the nonwage attributes of the jobs of alcoholics also vary, wage
losses are an unreliable measure ofproductivity losses. We elaborate based on
a formal theory the economic significance of the underlying differences. The
empirical results in section 9.4 show that alcoholics are less likely to receive a
variety offringe benefits, are more likely to be injured on thejob, and work for
smaller firms. Section 9.5 extends the conventional methodology ofestimating
productivity losses due to alcoholism to include nonwage job attributes. The
illustrative results suggest that the total loss ofalcoholism is at least 20 percent
larger than the wage loss.
In section 9.6 we extend our analysis to explore some relationships between
alcoholism and occupational choice. Without controlling for their occupational
status, alcoholics are estimated to earn 9.8 percent less than their nonalcoholic
peers, but alcoholism appears to have a much different impact on earnings for
blue-collarthan for white-collar workers. We find that alcoholics are less likely
to be in a white-collar occupation, butconditional upon being in a white-collar
occupation, their earnings are similar to their nonalcoholic peers. While alco-
holics are more likely to be in a blue-collar occupation, conditional upon being
in such an occupation they are estimated to earn 15 percent less than their non-
alcoholic peers.
In section 9.7 we explore the extent to which alcoholics earn less because
they bring less human capital to the job. Controlling for human capital vari-
ables including schooling, marital status, jobtenure, occupation, firm size, and
training attendance, the wage loss associated with alcoholism is reduced from253 Are Alcoholics in Bad Jobs?
9.8 percent to 4.6 percent. Ourresults suggest that in addition to a direct effect
of alcoholism on wages, alcoholism has important indirect effects through
these human capital variables. For the sample ofyoung adults considered here,
it also suggests that the consequences of alcoholism are likely to persist and
grow over time. By investing in less human capital as young adults, alcoholics
tend to place themselves on much different career and lifetime earnings tracks.
Finally, in section 9.8 we apply similar analysis to investigate, in addition to
alcoholism, relationships between smoking status and occupational choice. We
find that while drinking status has stronger adverse impacts on paid sick leave,
paid vacation, and retirement plans compared to smoking, the latter is some-
what more influential in dental and life insurance as well as parental leave.
In a companion paper (Kenkel and Wang 1996), we develop a generalized
rational addiction model in which occupation and postschooling human capital
accumulation are endogenously determined along with alcohol consumption
patterns. A growing numberofempirical studies ofcigarette, alcohol, and drug
consumption are based on the rational addiction model proposed by Becker
and Murphy (1988). To date, empirical tests ofthe model focus on estimating
demand for an addictive good as a function ofthe addictive stock, emphasizing
consistent estimates ofprice elasticities (Chaloupka 1991; Keeler et al. 1993;
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy 1994; Moore and Cook 1994; Waters and
Sloan 1995; Grossman and Chaloupka 1998; Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirta-
Ian 1998). As a logical extension ofthe Becker-Murphy model, we argue that
a rational addict will anticipate the labor market consequences of alcoholism
and make job choices accordingly. Extending the model ofrational addiction
to incorporate occupational choice will thus provide new leverage for empiri-
cal tests ofthis controversial theory. The results presented in this paper do not
provide definitive tests but, as discussed in the concluding section 9.8, shed
some light on the usefulness ofour approach.
A comment on terminology is in order at this point. We find it convenient to
use the terms alcoholic and alcoholism because they are succinct and familiar
to general audiences. In the empirical work below we use the more precise
term alcohol dependent, where alcohol dependence is defined based on the
American Psychiatric Association (1987) criteria listed in the appendix. For
some ofthe analyses we also use a measure ofheavy drinking, defined as the
number of times in the past month with six or more drinks on one occasion.
As might be expected, someone who meets diagnostic criteria for alcohol de-
pendence is likely to do a good amount of heavy drinking measured in this
way. The average alcohol-dependent male reported 5.3 days ofheavy drinking
in the pastmonth, compared to 1.16 days for nondependents (Kenkel and Ribar
1994). However, it is important to recognize that different measures capture
somewhat different drinking behaviors that may have different labor market
consequences. In an extremely useful illustrative exercise, Sindelar (1993) es-
timates the effects ofalcohol consumption onincome using 10 alternative mea-
sures of alcohol use. The estimated coefficients on the alcohol measures vary254 Donald S. Kenkel and Ping Wang
not only in magnitude but in sign. A crucial step is to use measures, as we do
here, that allow empirical distinctions between consumption at levels that are
likely to cause problems from more moderate or responsible drinking.
9.2 Productivity Losses from Alcoholism
Most studies of the effect of alcohol abuse in the labor market have been
conducted within the static human capital framework using cross-sectional
data. Since critical reviews ofthese studies exist elsewhere (Cook 1991; Mul-
lahy 1993), it is only necessary to highlight here some of the main results
and shortcomings. These studies estimate models in which current earnings or
income are specified to be a function of exogenous current drinking. They
generally conclude that problem drinking causes earnings losses in the range
from 10 to over 20 percent (Harwood et al. 1984; Rice et al. 1990).1 In contrast,
moderate drinking appears to be associated with higher earnings (Berger and
Leigh 1988; Cook 1991; French and Zarkin 1995). In a recent study, Zarkin et
al. (1998) find that male drinkers earn about 7 percent more than nondrinkers,
but somewhat surprisingly, they do not find evidence that this earnings differ-
ential disappears or becomes negative for heavier drinkers.
Several otheraspects ofthe productivity effects ofalcoholism have been ex-
plored. First, there is good evidence that the effects ofalcohol abuse on school-
ing are significant. As in an earlier study by Benham and Benham (1982),
Mullahy and Sindelar (1989) conclude that alcoholism is associated with lower
schooling attainment. Using datafrom the NLSY, Cook and Moore (1993) find
that frequently drunk youths are less likely to matriculate and graduate college
than those not frequently drunk. Second, the relationship between alcohol
abuse and earnings appears to change over the life cycle, where large negative
impacts of alcohol abuse are evident only after age 40 or so. Mullahy and
Sindelar (1993) speculate that nonalcoholic young adults' wages are initially
depressed because they stay in school longer and begin their career jobs later
than their alcoholic peers. A related explanation is that alcoholics and non-
alcoholics start at similar wages, but nonalcoholics' earnings profiles are
steeper because of higher returns to tenure. Of course, cross-sectional evi-
dence' where different individuals of different ages are compared at a point
in time, can be misleading on the pattern of wages over the life cycle for a
given individual.
A methodological shortcoming ofmany ofthe studies just cited is that they
implicitly treat alcohol abuse as a disease randomly striking a portion of the
population. There are several reasons that the corresponding econometric as-
1. The findings are somewhat controversial. Heien and Pittman (1993) were unable to replicate
the results ofHarwood et aI., even though both used the same data from the 1979 National Alco-
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sumption that alcohol abuse is exogenous in an earnings function may be vio-
lated. First, many personal and family background factors associated with the
development ofalcohol problems plausibly have direct effects on productivity
and earnings (Zucker and Gomberg 1986). An ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression of earnings on alcohol abuse that omits these personal attributes
yields a biased estimate that overstates the negative effect ofdrinking. Second,
there may be reciprocal causality between drinking and earnings. Simultaneity,
where through the budget constraint income is a determinant of alcohol con-
sumption, means that OLS results are biased away from finding any negative
effect ofdrinking on earnings. This source ofbias may help explain estimates
of a positive relationship between drinking and earnings. Kenkel and Ribar
(1994) conduct an in-depth empirical analysis using the NLSY data that uses
family- and individual-fixed-effects models to control for heterogeneity, and
instrumental variables (IV) models to address simultaneity. The complex pat-
tern ofresults suggests that alcohol problems have a direct negative impact on
earnings and marital status. Using the 1988 National Health Interview Survey,
Mullahy and Sindelar (1996) also find important differences between OLS and
IV estimates ofthe effects ofproblem drinking on employment status.
9.3 Measuring Productivity Losses When
Nonwage JobAttributes Vary
As the briefreview above indicates, estimating the impact ofalcoholism on
earnings has proven to be a difficult methodological challenge. This paper fo-
cuses on a methodological shortcoming that has received little attention to
date: Wage differences are unreliable estimates ofthe productivity losses from
alcoholism ifthere are important differences in the nonwage attributes ofthe
jobs ofproblem drinkers.2
To see the possible biases, it is useful to consider a simple model of job
choice depicted graphically in figure 9.1. The indifference curves drawn are
based on the assumption that the worker has homothetic preferences over after-
tax wage earnings (W) and the level ofa fringe benefit (F) (or other nonwage
job attribute). The assumption of homothetic preferences implies that the
worker chooses to receive the same proportions of fringe benefits and wages
at any level oftotal compensation.3 The worker's opportunity set is described
by the negatively sloped schedule W(F) showing possible combinations of
wages and fringes employers can offer, given the worker's level ofproductivity.
This assumes that the worker's productivity level is observed by the firm and
the labor market functions so that the worker's productivity is reflected in
2. This shortcoming is explicitly noted by Mullahy and Sindelar (1989) and Mullahy (1993),
but they were unable to address it due to data limitations.
3. Graphically, the assumption ofhomothetic preferences means that along a ray from the origin





Fig.9.1 Productivity versus wage losses with homothetic preferences
wages. For the sake ofsimplicity, it will be further assumed that W(F) is linear
and its slope is -1.4 The worker's optimizing job choice is given by the tan-
gency ofan indifference curve and the W(F) schedule.
Figure 9.1 shows the case where the measured earnings loss underestimates
the productivity loss associated with problem drinking. A drinking problem
means that the worker faces a lower schedule W'(F) ofavailable combinations
of wages and fringes reflecting his lower productivity. For the case shown in
figure 9.1, in response to his lower productivity, the worker's optimizing choice
involves lower wages and lower fringes; this is like the income effect in stan-
dard consumer-demand theory. The observed wage loss thus underestimates
the true productivity loss, which is given by the vertical distance between the
W(F) and W'(F) schedules.5 More specifically, for the case when the slope of
W(F) is equal to -1, it can easily be seen from figure 9.1 that the productivity
loss is exactly the sum ofthe wage and fringe losses. In practice, the favorable
tax treatment of fringes over wages means that the slope of W(F) is less in
absolute value than - 1. In this case, the productivity loss is greater than the
wage loss but less than the sum ofthe wage and fringe losses.
Mullahy (1993) emphasizes that the observed wage loss may overestimate
the productivity loss. This possibility is illustrated in figure 9.2, where the alco-
holic is assumed to have stronger preferences for the fringe benefit than does
a nonalcoholic. For example, the alcoholic might be more willing to accept
4. In the presence of a favorable tax treatment of fringe benefits, the slope of W(F) would
be less in absolute value than - 1, and could vary across workers who face different marginal
tax rates.
5. Notice that the vertical distance between W(F) and W'(F) is also the compensating variation
in income for the labor market consequences of alcoholism. That is, with that amount of extra
income added to his earned income, an alcoholic worker reaches the same indifference curve or










Fig.9.3 Productivity versus wage losses with nonhomothetic preferences II
lower wages in return for more generous health insurance, flexible hours, and
sick leave. In this case, part ofthe observed difference in the wages earned by
alcoholics and nonalcoholics is actually the compensating differential for the
higher level offringe benefits. Put differently, even ifthere were no productiv-
ity loss from alcoholism, alcoholics would choose to earn less butreceive more
generous fringes.
Figure 9.3 shows an alternative case, where the alcoholic has weaker prefer-
ences for the nonwage job attribute than does a nonalcoholic. This case can be
motivated in several ways. First, Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1991) argue
that people with relatively high rates of time preference are more likely to
become addicts. Ifthe typical alcoholic has an exogenously higher rate oftime
preference than the typical nonalcoholic, he will discount more heavily pen-
sions and other benefits that accrue in the future. By the same token, the alco-258 Donald S. Kenkel and Ping Wang
holic will be less willing to give up current wages for future wage growth,
and so could be expected to sort intojobs with relatively flat age-earnings pro-
files. Alternatively, in a rational addiction framework, Kenkel and Wang (1996)
build a model where alcohol consumption endogenously raises the time dis-
count rate, with the alcoholic becoming more impatient given an increased
probability of alcohol-related death.
6 Since the discount rate depends on the
consumer's choice variable, our model follows in the spirit ofthe existing en-
dogenous or recursive preference literature (Epstein 1987; Becker, Boyd, and
Sung 1989; Obstfeld 1990; Becker and Mulligan 1997; Palivos, Wang, and
Zhang 1997). This model also implies that the rational alcoholic will place a
lower value on fringe benefits like pensions and will sort into jobs with rela-
tively flat age-earnings profiles.
In the case shown in figure 9.3 the observed earnings losses again underesti-
mate the true productivity loss. The preference effect reinforces the income
effect shown in figure 9.1. It is notable that as long as the slope ofW(F) is -1,
the true productivity loss can still be measured by the sum of the wage and
fringe losses. This can easily be seen from figure 9.3, in which alcoholism
moves the optimal point from E to A. The productivity loss is given by CA,
which equals the wage loss ofBA plus the distance CB. The fringe benefit loss
is given by the distance BE. Since the slope ofW(F) is -1, BEis equal to CB,
thus verifying the assertion that the productivity loss equals the sum of the
wage loss and the fringe loss.
Finally, figure 9.4 shows the case where alcoholics face a different trade-off
between wages and fringes than do nonalcoholics: The schedule W'(F) has a
steeper slope than the schedule W(F), as well as a different intercept. For ex-
ample, providing health insurance to alcoholics may be more costly to employ-
ers, changing the rate at which wages can be traded for fringes.? In one large
Fortune 500 firm, insurance claims related to substance abuse accounted for
about 20 percent ofthe medical expenditures ofworkers aged 18-34 (McClel-
lan and Wise 1995). Similarly, the cost of providing a safe working environ-
ment may be a function ofthe worker's alcoholism. In addition, the cost ofnet
investments in a worker's human capital increases if alcoholism increases hu-
man capital depreciation (Kenkel and Wang 1996).
In figure 9.4 the increase in the relative price of fringe benefits causes the
alcoholic to substitute toward wage compensation. This once again creates a
bias such that observed earnings losses underestimate the true productivity loss
ofalcoholism. Moreover, when the slope ofW(F) is -1, we can show that the
productivity loss from alcoholism exceeds the sum of the wage and fringe
6. Scientific evidence on mortality risks suggests that this endogenous time-discounting effect
would be even more relevant for smoking behavior.
7. This raises interesting and difficult questions about the effects of asymmetric information,
where the employerdoes not perfectly observe an employee's alcoholism. The conditions required
to reach a market equilibrium that avoids adverse selection problems remain unexplored in the lit-





Fig. 9.4 Productivity versus wage losses with nonhomothetic preferences and
wage-fringe trade-off
losses. In figure 9.4, alcoholism moves the optimal point from E to A. The
productivity loss from alcoholism is measured by CD = CB + BD.8 The corre-
sponding wage and fringe losses are BD - AF and BE + DF, respectively.
Since the slope of W(F) is -1, CB is equal to BE. Also, the slope ofW'(F) is
steeper than the -45-degree line, implying that AF is greater than DF. Thus,
we can show that CD = CB + BD = (BE + AF) + (BD - AF) > (BE +
DF) + (BD - AF); that is, the productivity loss due to alcohol abuse is larger
than the sum ofwage and fringe losses.
According to the formal dynamic general-equilibrium model ofrational ad-
diction and occupational choice by Kenkel and Wang (1996), it is possible a
priori to categorize job characteristics as "alcoholic preferred," "nonalcoholic
preferred" or "neutral." Ofthe fringe benefits considered in the empirical work
below, compared to their nonalcoholic peers, alcoholics are expected to have
stronger preferences for health insurance, paid sick leave, and a flexible work
schedule. Nonalcoholics are expected to have stronger preferences for life in-
surance, retirement plans, profit sharing, and employer-provided training and
educational opportunities. There seems to be no strong reason, however, to
expect alcoholics and nonalcoholics to have systematically different prefer-
ences for the other fringe benefits measured (dental insurance, paid vacation,
maternity/paternity leave, employee discounts, child care, meals, and parking).
8. The distance CD represents the productivity loss from alcoholism in that it is the compensat-
ing variation in income for the labor market consequences ofalcoholism. The case shown in figure
9.4 differs from earlier cases because there are two components to the loss. First, even ifall com-
pensation were paid in the form of wages, the alcoholic worker would receive less. Second, the
alcoholic worker that receives any fringe benefits suffers an additional loss because he or she has
to give up more in wages to get the fringe benefits.260 Donald S. Kenkel and Ping Wang
In summary, by documenting the relationships between alcoholism and a
variety of fringe benefits, the results will provide evidence on the empirical
importance ofthe four cases reviewed corresponding to figures 9.1-9.4. Based
on Kenkel and Wang (1996), we argue that the alcohol consumption stock not
only has an addiction effect on preferences, but is allowed to result in a higher
subjective discount rate. In contrast to the existing literature, we argue further
that job selection and human capital investment should also be influenced by
addictive behavior because a worker's drinking status is, in essence, part ofthe
job requirements, and because alcohol consumption can increase the speed of
human capital depreciation.
Finally, we emphasize that our empirical examination ofthe possible effects
ofalcoholism on an array oflabor market outcomes is only a first step toward
our long-term goal. In our model, a worker who selects a higher-value jobthat
requires more strictly nondrinking behavior also faces a higher human capital
maintenance cost, thus providing bidirectional feedback between occupational
choice and addictive behavior (Kenkel and Wang 1996). In orderto account for
the possible endogeneity of addictive behavior in the context of labor market
decisions, one must carefully study not only the alcohol demand schedule and
the underlying preferences but also the relevant incentive and regulatory struc-
tures. Due to its consequent complexity, the far more demanding empirical
task of identifying a structural model along these lines by incorporating the
endogenous use and abuse ofalcohol has not yet been undertaken in the pres-
ent study.
9.4 Comparing the Jobs ofAlcoholics and Nonalcoholics
The primary data to be used in this analysis comes from the 1989 wave of
the NLSY. The NLSY contains detailed economic and demographic informa-
tion for 12,686 individuals who were 14 to 21 years old in 1979. Retention is
roughly 90 percent. For this study we focus on men. For reasons that are not
fully understood, the labor market consequences of·alcoholism appear to be
much different for women (Mullahy and Sindelar 1991; Kenkel and Ribar
1994). As a result, extending the analysis to women would greatly complicate
the analysis and discussion, although it is an important avenue for future work.
After restricting the sample to men who were employed in 1989, and eliminat-
ing observations with missing values, the sample sizes analyzed are around
3,700 respondents.
The NLSY has become a standard data source for empirical labor econom-
ics, and contains a rich array oflabor market outcomes, including measures of
fringe benefits and other job attributes. In several years the survey also ad-
dresses alcohol consumption. Based on responses to a set of questions asked
in 1989, we constructed a measure of alcohol dependence that corresponds to
the American PsychiatricAssociation's (1987) Diagnostic andStatistical Man-
ual ofMental Disorders III (DSM-III) definitions. About 20 percent of the261 Are Alcoholics in Bad Jobs?
Table 9.1 Variable Definitions and Means
Variable Definition Mean Standard Deviation
Alcohol measures
Alcohol dependency = 1 ifmeets DSM-IIIR
criteria for alcohol dependence; 0 otherwise
Heavy drinking = Number ofdays in past month
had 6 or more drinks (1989)
Background measures
Year ofbirth
Nonintact family at age 14
Household member received magazines
when respondent aged 14







Attended religious services regularly at age 14














sample of young adult men meet the criteria for alcohol dependence; this is
roughly comparable to national prevalence estimates for young adult men
(Grant et al. 1991). Table 9.1 presents the definitions, means, and standard de-
viations ofthe explanatory variables used in the analysis.
Table 9.2 reports estimates ofthe effect ofalcohol dependence on the proba-
bility the respondent reports receiving various fringe benefits.9 The estimates
are from 14 separate probit models that control for various individual, family,
and cultural background variables. These additional independent variables,
listed in table 9.1, include year ofbirth, ethnicity, mother's and father's educa-
tion, numberofsiblings, and the respondent's score on theArmed Forces Qual-
ifying Test (AFQT), a standardized intelligence test. An additional set ofvari-
ables measured when the respondent was age 14 indicate nonintact family,
religious attendance, magazine subscriptions, and ownership ofa library card.
The probit coefficients have been transformed to show the effect on the proba-
bility of a discrete change of the alcohol dependence dummy variable from
zero to one; the proportion ofthe sample receiving each fringe benefit is also
reported for a pointofreference. Alcohol dependence is associated with a 5-10
percentage point reduction in the probability of receiving most major fringe
benefits, including health insurance, paid sick leave, paid vacations, and retire-
ment plans.
Table 9.3 reports estimates of the effect of alcohol dependence on several
9. Every fringe benefit included in the NLSY questionnaire is included in the analysis.262 Donald S. Kenkel and Ping Wang
Table 9.2 Alcohol Dependence Status and Fringe Benefits
Effect ofAlcohol Dependence
Fringe Benefit Sample Proportion on Probability
Health insurance 0.764 -0.064***
(0.018)
Life insurance 0.643 -0.055***
(0.021)
Paid sick leave 0.575 -0.105***
(0.022)
Dental insurance 0.509 -0.046**
(0.022)
Paid vacation 0.774 -0.059***
(0.018)
Parental leave 0.485 -0.047**
(0.023)
Retirement plan 0.534 -0.090***
(0.022)
Employee discounts 0.453 0.006
(0.022)
Flexible work schedule 0.437 0.018
(0.022)




Child care 0.042 0.001
(0.008)




Note: Probit models based on 1989 data from the NLSY for men. Probit coefficient has been
transformed to show the effect on the probability ofa discrete change ofthe alcohol dependency
dummy variable from zero to one. Standard errors are in parentheses. Models are estimated with
additional explanatory variables, including year of birth, ethnicity, nonintact family/religious at-
tendance/magazines/library card at age 14, mother's and father's education, siblings, and AFQT
score.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
***Significant at the 1percent level.
otherjobcharacteristics and labormarket outcomes. The results remain consis-
tent with the idea that alcoholics are in badjobs and suffer worse labor market
outcomes. Alcohol-dependent workers are less likely to be in a white-collar
occupation and more likely to be injured on the job. The 3.3 percentage point
increase in the on-the-job injury rate associated with alcohol dependence is a
very substantial increase (37.5 percent) compared to the sample average injury
rate of 8.8 percent. There is also a substantial difference in the size of the263 Are Alcoholics in Bad Jobs?
Table 9.3 Alcohol Dependence Status and Job Characteristics
Job characteristic
White-collar occupation
Like job very much
Injury/illness occurred at job























































firms where alcohol-dependent workers find employment. Compared to their
nonalcoholic peers, alcohol dependents work at firms that employ 23.5 percent
fewer workers (as measured by the numberofemployees at the same worksite).
In terms ofemployment status, alcohol-dependent workers are more likely to
be unemployed and, ifemployed, are less likely to be in a full-time job. When
employed, they are also more likely to be injobs where compensation is partly
in the form oftips and bonuses rather than straight wages or salaries.
For the models reported in tables 9.2 and 9.3, alcohol dependence is as-
sumed to be an exogenous explanatory variable. For the reasons discussed in
section 9.2, the econometric exogeneity assumption can be questioned on sev-
eral grounds. A particular concern in the present context is reverse causality,
where workers are more likely to become alcohol dependent because they are
in a badjob that offers poor fringe benefits and other working conditions.264 Donald S. Kenkel and Ping Wang















































































Several pieces of preliminary evidence suggest that reverse causality may
not be an important phenomenon.lO The first piece ofevidence is in table 9.3,
where alcohol dependence is estimated to have apositive but statistically insig-
nificant effect on the probability the worker reports liking his job "very much."
If reverse causality were operative, presumably alcohol-dependent workers
would be less satisfied with theirjobs.
Additional evidence on the importance of reverse causality is contained in
table 9.4, which compares the effect ofcurrent (1989) heavy drinking and past
(1984) heavy drinking on the probability ofreceiving fringe benefits in 1989.
10. A more structural approach is to develop a simultaneous model ofalcohol and labor market
decisions. This model would suggest exclusion restrictions to motivate an instrumental variables
approach.265 Are Alcoholics in Bad Jobs?
The reasoning is that poor working conditions in 1989 cannot cause heavy
drinking in 1984, so the estimated effect ofpastheavy drinking is not contami-
nated by reverse causality.ll The simple correlation between past and current
heavy drinking is only about 0.35, indicating that many workers' drinking hab-
its were quite different in the two time periods. However, the estimated effects
ofpast heavy drinking on the current probability ofreceiving the fringe bene-
fits are often nearly as large as the estimated effects ofcurrent heavy drinking.
This is suggestive evidence that heavy drinking in 1984 had consequences for
future job outcomes, consistent with the causal relationship asserted in this
empirical study.
9.5 Estimating the Productivity Loss Due to Alcoholism
It is notable that alcohol dependents are estimated to be less likely to receive
a variety offringe benefits. In particular, they are estimated to be 6.4 percent
less likely to receive health insurance benefits and 10.5 percent less likely to
receive paid sick leave, even though on a priori grounds these benefits were
categorized as alcoholic preferred. Interpreted in the simple model developed
in section 9.3, it appears that any effect due to alcoholics' stronger preferences
for certain fringe benefits is outweighed by some combination of the income
effect oftheir lower productivity and the substitution effect ofthe higher cost
ofproviding fringe benefits to alcoholics. That is, the estimated net effects of
alcohol dependence on fringes seem to lend support to the cases elaborated in
figures 9.1, 9.3, or 9.4. In these cases, there is an important implication: Ob-
served wage losses underestimate the productivity loss of alcoholism. By in-
corporating other employee compensation, the sum of wage losses and fringe
benefit losses provides either an approximation or a lower bound to the true
loss.
Calculating the true productivity loss due to alcoholism is simple in the spe-
cial case described by figure 9.1, where alcoholics and nonalcoholics have
identical, homothetic preferences between wages and fringe benefits.12 The as-
sumption ofhomothetic preferences implies that workers always take the same
proportion oftotal compensation as fringe benefits. Hence, a 1percent decline
in productivity causes wages to fall by 1 percent and causes fringe benefits to
fall by 1 percent. The wage loss understates the total productivity loss by the
same proportion as wage compensation understates total compensation. In
1989, for the nation as a whole, the value offringe benefits (excluding legally
11. This reasoning is not strictly consistent with rational addiction, because in that model, the
future can cause the present. For example, Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) estimate that
current cigarette consumption is a function of future cigarette prices. If poor working conditions
in 1989 are anticipated, the rational addict will increase consumption in earlier periods. The inter-
temporal linkages suggested by the rational addiction model make sorting out causality extremely
challenging. We thank Michael Grossman for this insight.
12. We thank Michael Grossman for the argument developed in this paragraph.266 Donald S. Kenkel and Ping Wang

































required payments) made up about 29 percent oftotal payroll (U.S. Chamber
ofCommerce 1990). This suggests that the wage loss will understate the pro-
ductivity loss due to alcoholism by about 29 percent.
The above calculation ofthe relationship between the wage loss and the total
productivity loss due to alcoholism rests on the strong assumptions behind
figure 9.1. A more data-driven approach is to combine the results in table 9.2
of the relationship between alcoholism and fringe benefits with data on em-
ployers' costs offringe benefits. Table 9.5 lists employers' 1989 fringe benefits
costs per employee, from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1990). Based on
the results from table 9.2, the expected fringe benefit cost ofa typical alcoholic
worker is estimated to be $450, or almost 7 percent lower than the expected
fringe benefit cost ofa nonalcoholic worker. For the case shown in figure 9.3,
the total productivity loss of alcoholism is estimated as the sum of the wage
loss and the value of the fringe benefits lost. Below we report estimates that
alcohol dependence is associated with a 9.8 percent reduction in earnings, im-
plying that the average wage loss peralcoholic is $1,929. The total productivity
loss is thus estimated at $2,378, and lost earnings understate the total produc-
tivity loss by about 20 percent. The results could be viewed as evidence against
the assumptions behind figure 9.1 (homothetic preferences), because alcohol-
ism is not associated with equal percentage reductions in earnings and fringe
benefits (a 9.8 percent reduction in earnings but only a 7 percent reduction in
the value of fringe benefits). However, the percentage reductions are reason-
ably close in magnitude. The data-driven approach and the approach that as-
sumes homotheticity also yield similar conclusions, that lost earnings under-
state the productivity loss by 20 to 29 percent.
Previous research on the productivity effects ofalcoholism have used a num-267 Are Alcoholics in Bad Jobs?
ber of outcome measures, including personal income, household income, and
wages, but these studies have failed to include fringe benefits (Mullahy 1993).
Our analysis and empirical results suggest that these studies using the conven-
tional methodology may have understated the total productivity loss by 20 per-
cent or more.
13 Should the substitution effect described in figure 9.4 become
a dominant force, our estimate above would still underestimate the true pro-
ductivity loss. Moreover, due to a possible consequence of alcoholism for in-
creased probability ofdeath, health-related quits, and layoffs, the above static
measure ofproductivity loss has a further downward bias.
Ofcourse, our estimate is developed by extending the conventional method-
ology for estimating productivity losses to include the value offringe benefits.
Consequently, it shares the shortcomings noted of that methodology in de-
termining whether the negative relationship between alcoholism and fringe
benefits is causal. It should also be noted that neither the conventional method-
ology nor the calculations above distinguish between internal costs to the alco-
holic and external costs the alcoholic imposes on others (Manning etal. 1991).
9.6 Alcoholism and Occupational Choice
Choice of occupation is a good example of a decision typically made in
young adulthood but with potentially life-long consequences. A systematic re-
lationship between alcoholism and occupational choice is accordingly ofgreat
concern. Based on Kenkel and Wang (1996), we argue that job selection and
addictive behavior should be jointly determined by a rational optimizing
worker. Specifically, we can sortjobs according to their characteristics in terms
oftheir requirements or expectations about workers' drinking characteristics:
the lowest-value job represents the least concern about drinking status and is
thus more suitable for problem drinkers, whereas the highest-value job repre-
sents the most concern about workers' drinking status and is more suitable
for nonalcoholics. Alcohol consumption can also increase the speed ofhuman
capital depreciation. When the size of this detrimental effect of alcohol on
human capital is assumed to be job specific (i.e., for a job more suitable for
problem drinkers, human capital depreciation is less sensitive to alcohol addic-
tions), selecting ajobwith a high value ofa characteristic will increase produc-
tivity and hence the rate ofreturn on human capital, but it is at the expense of
higher human capital maintenance cost (as reflected by the alcohol-specific
responses to human capital depreciation). This tension will provide an endoge-
nous determination of occupational choice, depending on the preference side
ofthe addictive behavior.
Occupational requirements concerning workers' drinking habits are not di-
13. Rice et al. (1990) assume alcoholism reduces employer contributions for social insurance,
private pensions, and welfare funds by the same percentage as it reduces wages. The study does
not contain direct evidence on this, but as shown above, this is consistent with an implicit assump-
tion that workers' preferences over wages and fringe benefits are homothetic.268 Donald S. Kenkel and Ping Wang





































Source: 1989 data from the NLSY for men.
recdy observable. To begin to explore general occupational differences, table
9.6 presents simple tabulations from the NLSY comparing the proportions of
alcohol nondependents and dependents in different occupational categories.
About 37.5 percent of nondependents are in white-collar occupations, com-
pared to only 30.9 percent ofdependents. In contrast, only 48.1 percentofnon-
dependents are in blue-collar occupations, compared to 57.9 percent of de-
pendents. There is also a somewhat smaller difference showing that alcohol
dependents are less likely to be in service occupations.
Table 9.7 presents mean and median earnings by occupation and alcohol
dependence status. Among those workers in white-collar occupations, alcohol
dependents appear to earn nearly as much as nondependents. There are virtu-
ally no differences in median earnings between the two groups, while mean
earnings are somewhat higher for nondependent workers. In contrast, in terms
of either median or mean earnings, alcohol-dependent workers in blue-collar
occupations earn less than nondependent workers. Alcohol-dependent service
workers earn somewhat less than nondependents. There appears to be a large
difference in the earnings ofnondependent and alcohol-dependent farm work-
ers, but this should be interpreted cautiously due to the small cell sizes.
Table 9.8 presents estimated earnings functions, to explore some ofthe pat-
terns detected in table 9.8 in a multivariate context. As a benchmark, across all
occupations, alcohol-dependent workers are estimated to earn 9.8 percent less
than their nondependent peers. Additional regression results confirm that most
ofthe earnings loss associated with alcoholism appears to be concentrated in
the blue-collar occupations. Conditional upon being in a white-collar occupa-
tion, the estimated effect of alcohol dependence is statistically insignificant,
although the point estimate is that dependence reduces earnings by 5 percent.
In contrast, conditional upon being in a blue-collar occupation, alcohol depen-
dence is estimated to reduce earnings by 15.4 percent (which is statistically
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Note: OLS regressions with In (earnings) as the dependent variable. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. Models are estimated with additional explanatory variables, including year of birth, eth-
nicity, nonintact family/religious attendance/magazines/library card at age 14, mother's and fa-
ther's education, siblings, and AFQT score.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
9.7 Alcoholism and Human Capital
In this section we estimate alternative specifications of earnings functions
to explore the extent to which alcoholics earn less because they bring less hu-
man capital to the job due to their lower incentive to undertake postschooling
learning and their higher human capital maintenance cost (as reflected by the
endogenous human capital depreciation).
The first specification in table 9.9 estimates the effect ofalcohol dependence
on earnings without controlling for human capital investment. 14 This model re-
produces the benchmark model presented in the last section (table 9.8), and
indicates that the total effect of alcohol dependence on earnings is a 9.8 per-
cent loss.
The second specification in table 9.9 is an earnings function that includes
schooling, marital status, job tenure, occupation, firm size, and training atten-
dance. Each of these human capital variables has a statistically and econom-
ically significant effect on earnings. For example, each additional year of
schooling raises earnings by 5.4 percent, marriage raises earnings by 24.4 per-
cent, and training attendance raises earnings by 15.1 percent. White-collar
workers earn 31.7 percent more and blue-collar workers earn 22.5 percent
more than workers in the omitted occupational categories (service and farm
workers).
Once aspects ofhuman capital are controlled for, the estimated earnings loss
associated with alcohol dependence falls to 4.6 percent. Therefore, ofthe total
earnings loss of9.8 percent only 4.6 percent is the direct effect ofalcoholism,
while the remaining 5.2 percent is the indirect effect of alcoholism through
14. By including the AFQT score, the model does control for ability differences. While ability
is an aspect ofhuman capital, it is not an investment choice variable ofthe individual. For a study
ofschooling on alcohol consumption via health knowledge, see Kenkel (1991). Forcharacterizing
endogenous human capital accumulation in a dynamic general equilibrium framework, see Bond,
Wang, and Yip (1996).271 Are Alcoholics in Bad Jobs?
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measured human capital variables. Ofcourse, there may be additional unmeas-
ured aspects ofhuman capital that are also systematically related to alcohol-
ism. Viewed this way, a 4.6 percent earnings loss is an upper-bound estimate
ofthe direct effect ofalcoholism.
The pattern ofresults in table 9.9 means that alcohol dependence is system-
atically related to the set ofhuman capital variables added in the second speci-
fication. Table 9.10 presents direct evidence on these relationships. Alcohol
dependence is associated with about one-third of a year less schooling and a
13.7 percent lower probability of being married. Alcohol dependence is also
estimated (somewhat imprecisely) to reduce tenure on the job by 2.4 months
(compared to a medianjobtenure of24 months in this sample ofyoung adults).
Consistent with the patterns in table 9.5, alcohol dependence is estimated to
decrease the probability of being in a white-collar occupation by 4.7 percent
and to increase the probability of being in a blue-collar occupation by 9.1
percent. Alcohol dependence is estimated to have a negative effect on the prob-
ability of attending training, but the effect is small and statistically insignifi-
cant.
9.8 Job Choice and Smoking Status
Alcoholism is an interesting addiction to study in a labor market context
because there are clear channels through which alcohol abuse can directly
reduce worker productivity. Cigarette smoking is an alternative common ad-
diction where the direct productivity effects are probably much less impor-272 Donald S. Kenkel and Ping Wang
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tant. 15 However, smoking is still expected to be associated with the individual
rate of time preference, both because high discounters are more likely to be-
come addicted to cigarettes and because smoking reduces life expectancy, thus
endogenously increasing the discount rate. This section reports preliminary re-
sults on the relationships between alcoholism, smoking status, andjob charac-
teristics. Viewing smoking status as a proxy for time preference, the results
shed light on the relative importance ofthe productivity and human capital de-
preciation effects ofalcoholism compared to the role ofindividual preferences
between present and future consumption.
Table 9.11 presents estimates of the effects of alcohol dependence and
smoking status on the probability ofreceiving the same fringe benefits consid-
ered in table 9.2. Smoking status is measured on a lifetime basis, from survey
responses indicating having ever smoked more than 100 cigarettes.16 Control-
ling for lifetime smoking status, alcohol dependence continues to be associated
with lowerprobabilities ofreceiving majorfringe benefits. However, compared
15. This is particularly the case in a sample of young adults, where the long-term health ef-
fects-including lung cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and heart disease-will not
yet be manifested. While this is also true for the chronic effects ofheavy drinking, such drinking
also has acute effects such as hangovers and lost sleep, not to mention the productivity effects of
on-the-job drinking. Levine, Gustafson, and Velenchik (1997) estimate that smoking reduces
wages by roughly 3 to 8 percent, but suggest that this may mainly reflect higher health insurance
costs for workers who smoke.
16. Questions on smoking are included in the 1984 and 1992 waves of the NLSY. We use
responses from the 1992 wave to measure lifetime smoking as of 1989; respondents who started
smoking after 1989 are given a value ofzero.273 Are Alcoholics in Bad Jobs?
Table 9.11 Alcohol Dependence Status, Smoking Status, and Fringe Benefits
Effect ofAlcohol Dependence Effect ofSmoking
Fringe Benefit on Probability Status on Probability
Health insurance -0.035* -0.051***
(0.020) (0.016)
Life insurance -0.031 -0.064***
(0.024) (0.018)
Paid sick leave -0.080*** -0.064***
(0.025) (0.019)
Dental insurance -0.029 -0.069***
(0.025) (0.019)
Paid vacation -0.046** -0.027*
(0.020) (0.016)
Parental leave -0.027 -0.087***
(0.026) (0.021)
Retirement plan -0.074*** -0.044**
(0.025) (0.019)
Employee discounts 0.033 -0.006
(0.025) (0.019)
Flexible work schedule 0.031 -0.039**
(0.025) (0.019)
Profit sharing -0.022 -0.004
(0.023) (0.018)
Training/education opportunities -0.016 -0.078***
(0.025) (0.019)
Child care -0.001 -0.004
(0.010) (0.007)




Note: See notes to tables 9.2.
to the results in table 9.2, controlling for smoking status results in smaller (in
absolute value) estimated effects ofalcohol dependence; some estimates also
lose statistical significance. Lifetime smoking status itself is associated with
statistically significantly lower probabilities ofreceiving major fringe benefits.
Moreover, our results indicate that while drinking status has a stronger adverse
impact on the fringes of paid sick leave, paid vacation, and retirement plans
compared to smoking, the latter is somewhat more influential in dental and life
insurance as well as parental leave. One interpretation ofthese patterns is that
job choices, and consequently fringe benefit choices, reflect both variation in
individual rates of time preference and the productivity effects of alcohol
abuse.274 Donald S. Kenkel and Ping Wang
9.9 Concluding Comments
Our analysis of data from the NLSY suggests that young men who meet
criteriafor alcohol dependence are indeed inbadjobs. Theirjobs are less likely
to offer major fringe benefits, are more dangerous, and are at smaller firms.
Theirjobs also pay less, in part because alcoholics bring less human capital to
the job than do their nonalcoholic peers. Ofcourse, these patterns are open to
several interpretations. Particularly because ofthe important role human capi-
tal variables play, some ofthe benchmark patterns are consistent with the job
choices of rational addicts who anticipate the labor market consequences of
alcoholism. Many ofthe results, especially the results in section 9.8 that show
that smokers are in bad jobs, suggest that differences in individual rates of
time preference may have important labor market consequences. This is again
consistent with the jobchoices ofrational addicts, but it is also consistent with
other models ofaddictive behavior. Sharper tests ofthe labor market implica-
tions ofthe rational addiction model await future work.
Studies of alcohol abuse in the labor market, including ours, have not at-
tempted to distinguish separate supply-side and demand-side effects. Previous
empirical studies investigate whether, in equilibrium, workers who abuse alco-
hol are paid less; our analysis extends the approach to consider a much wider
array ofjob attributes. The effects ofalcoholism are often assumed to be pri-
marily supply-side phenomena, reflecting individuals' labor supply decisions.
This is more plausible for some ofthe indirect effects of alcohol abuse, such
as lower schooling attainment, and less plausible for other effects, such as the
increased unemployment of alcohol abusers. The observed patterns reported
above might be at least partly demand-side phenomena. Ifemployer screening
is effective, alcohol abusers will be unemployed or placed in less demand-
ing, low-wage jobs where drinking has fewer safety and productivity conse-
quences. In a general model ofemployer search, Barron, Bishop, and Dunkel-
berg (1985) suggest that employers will increase search efforts when filling
positions that require more training. They estimate that higher levels oftrain-
ing provided in the first month are associated with more extensive and intensive
employer search. They also estimate that the level ofon-the-job training is as-
sociatedwith the numberofapplicants screenedand the average screening time
per applicant. To the extent employers' search efforts weed out problem drink-
ers, an occupational sorting will result where problem drinkers end up in jobs
that require little training. This provides an alternative explanation for the labor
market consequences explored here, with obvious implications for our model
ofconsumer/worker behavior.
As noted earlier, this present research, based on the examination ofthe 1989
wave ofthe NLSY data for men, serves only as a first step toward understand-
ing the interplays between alcohol addictive behavior and labor market out-
comes. Future work along these lines may also consider using other waves, in-
cluding women to investigate gender differences (Mullahy and Sindelar 1991),275 Are Alcoholics in Bad Jobs?
comparing our findings with those experimental outcomes by behavioral
economists, undertaking careful cross-cultural comparisons, and, ofparticular
interest, examining the alcohol consequences ofquit and layoffprobabilities.17
Appendix
Psychiatric CriteriaforAlcohol Dependency
The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
ofMental Disorders, third edition, revised (DSM-IIIR) defines criteria for the
diagnosis of alcohol abuse and dependence. A diagnosis of alcohol depen-
dence requires that an individual meet at least three of the nine criteria listed
below, with some symptoms of the disturbance having persisted for at least
one month or having occurred repeatedly over a longer period oftime.
1. Substance often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period than the
person intended
2. Persistent desire or one or more unsuccessful efforts to cut down or con-
trol use
3. A great deal oftime spent in activities to get alcohol, drinking, or recov-
ering from its effects
4. Frequent intoxication or withdrawal symptoms when expected to fulfill
major role obligations at work, school, orhome or when substance use is phys-
ically hazardous
5. Important social, occupation, or recreational activities given up or re-
duced because ofuse
6. Continued use despite knowledge ofhaving a persistent or recurrent so-
cial, psychological, or physical problem that is caused or exacerbated by use
7. Marked tolerance
8. Characteristic withdrawal symptoms
9. Substance often taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms
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